Abstract. In this paper, we present a correlation attack on Sosemanuk with complexity less than 2 150 . Sosemanuk is a software oriented stream cipher proposed by Berbain et al. to the eSTREAM call for stream cipher and has been selected in the final portfolio. Sosemanuk consists of a linear feedback shift register(LFSR) of ten 32-bit words and a finite state machine(FSM) of two 32-bit words. By combining linear approximation relations regarding the FSM update function, the FSM output function and the keystream output function, it is possible to derive linear approximation relations with correlation −2 −21.41 involving only the keystream words and the LFSR initial state. Using such linear approximation relations, we mount a correlation attack with complexity 2 147.88 and success probability 99% to recover the initial internal state of 384 bits. We also mount a correlation attack on SNOW 2.0 with complexity 2 204.38 .
Introduction
Sosemanuk [3] is a software oriented stream cipher proposed by Berbain et al. to the eSTREAM call for stream cipher and has been selected in the final portfolio. The merits of Sosemanuk has been recognized as its considerable security margin and moderate performance [2] .
Sosemanuk is based on the stream cipher SNOW 2.0 [11] and the block cipher Serpent [1] . Though SNOW 2.0 is a highly reputed stream cipher, it is vulnerable to linear distinguishing attacks using linear masks [14, 15] . To strengthen against linear distinguishing attacks, Sosemanuk applies the multiplication modulo 2 32 with a bit rotation in the FSM update function and a Serpent S-box in bit slice mode in the keystream output function. As of now, there are no known attacks against Sosemanuk with complexity less than 2 226 [5] . Linear masking has been used in the linear distinguishing attacks on wordbased stream ciphers such as SNOW 1.0 [9] , SNOW 2.0, NLS [7] , and Dragon [8] . Coppersmith et al. [9] presented a linear distinguishing attack on SNOW 1.0. They identified linear approximation relations of large correlation involving only the LFSR states and the keystream words. Then using simple bitwise recurrence relations between the LFSR state words, they were able to mount a linear distinguishing attack on SNOW 1.0. Watanabe et al. [15] presented a linear distinguishing attack on SNOW 2.0 and then Nyberg and Wallén [14] refined the attack.
On the other hand, Berbain et al. [4] presented a correlation attack on Grain using linear approximation relations between the initial LFSR state and the keystream bits to recover the initial LFSR state. As to solving systems of linear approximation equations, similar technique was used in [6] and iterative decoding technique was used in [12] .
In this paper, combining the linear masking method with the techniques in [4] using fast Walsh transform to recover the initial LFSR state of Grain, we mount a correlation attack on Sosemanuk. The time, data and memory complexity are all less than 2
150 . This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we present a description of Sosemanuk. In Sect. 3, we show how to get approximation relations between the initial LFSR state and the keystream words. In Sect. 4, we describe the attack using the approximation relations. In Sect. 5, we present simulation results. In Sect. 6, we present a correlation attack on SNOW 2.0. We conclude in Sect. 7.
Preliminaries

Notations and Definitions
We define the correlation of a function with respect to masks as follows. Let
n be a function and let Γ 0 , Γ 1 , . . . , Γ k be n-bit masks. Then the correlation of f with respect to the tuple (
where · represents the inner product which will be omitted henceforth. We also define the correlation of an approximation relation as 2 Prob(the approximation holds) − 1 .
The following notations will be used in the following sections. 
Description of Sosemanuk
The structure of Sosemanuk [3] is depicted in Fig. 1 . Sosemanuk consists of three main components: a 10-word linear feedback shift register, a 2-word finite state machine, and a nonlinear output function. Sosemanuk is initialized with the key of length in between 128 and 256 and the 128-bit initialization value. The output of the cipher is a sequence of 32-bit keystream words (z t ) t≥1 . The LFSR state at time t is denoted by LR t = (s t+1 , s t+2 , . . . , s t+10 ).(t = 0 designates the time after initialization.) The LFSR is updated using the recurrence relation
where α is a zero of the primitive polynomial
, where γ is a zero of the primitive polynomial
on GF(2)(X). The FSM state at time t is denoted by (R1 t , R2 t ). The FSM is updated as follows.
where M = 0x54655307. The FSM has output
The keystream words are obtained as follows.
where Serpent1 denotes the Serpent S-box S 2 applied in bit slice mode. Four words are output per 4 LFSR clockings.
Linear Approximations
In this section, we get linear approximation relations involving only the LFSR states and the keystream words with non-negligible correlation by approximating the FSM update functions, the FSM output functions, and the keystream output function using linear masks with non-negligible correlation. Let a t = lsb(R1 t ). We consider the following approximations using 32-bit linear masks Γ by replacing all operations (modular additions and the Trans function) by XORs in the FSM update function and the FSM output function: XORing the above relations and applying the Piling-Up Lemma, we have the approximation
with correlation c2 + (Γ ) 3 c2 T (Γ ) assuming that the four linear approximations are independent.
However the way of computing the correlation as above is not accurate since the approximation relations have high dependencies. For example, approximations of two modular additions with correlations c 1 , c 2 do not necessarily yield an approximation with correlation c 1 c 2 . So we need to consider approximation relations which do not have obvious dependencies. We have the following equations regarding the internal states and keystream words:
We consider the following associated approximation relations
where Γ and Λ are linear masks as depicted in Fig. 2 
In order to remove terms involving f t and f t+1 in (1), we will utilize a linear approximation relation regarding the keystream output function that comes from the third S-box S 2 of the block cipher Serpent in bit slice mode. Each of such approximation relations gives linear approximation relations regarding the keystream output function. We will use the relation
which induces the following relation for any j = 0, . . . , 31,
holds with correlation ( (1) and (2) 
with correlation
when t ≡ 1(mod 4), assuming that the approximations are independent. Note that we don't see obvious dependencies between the approximations given above.
We check the validity of our estimation by simulations described in Sect. 5.
Search for Linear Masks
We try to find Γ such that |C(Γ )| is as large as possible. Taking into consideration the factor ( wt(Γ ) , we confined the search to masks of weight less than or equal to 5. Furthermore, we have the following observation from many examples though we don't have a proof:
Based on this observation, we compute C(Γ ) for a given mask Γ in the following way: If c2 T (Γ ) = 0, then 1. we compute c3 + (Γ ) using [14 
Correlation Attack on Sosemanuk
In this section, we describe a correlation attack against Sosemanuk recovering the initial internal state. Using the approximation relations (3) 
for each j > 0, where G is the "dual" of the LFSR update transformation and is given by
where α * Γ and (α −1 ) * Γ are 32-bit linear masks such that (α * Γ )(x) = Γ (αx) and
To be more explicit, the approximation relations (3) can be rewritten as
which are again equivalent to
where F = G 4 . Thus the complexity of getting R relations between the initial LFSR state and the keystream words is comparable to the complexity of getting 128R bits of keystream.
Recovering Part of the Initial LFSR State. We apply the "Second LFSR Derivation Technique" in [4] . Let n = 320 be the size of the LFSR state in bits and m < n. Let = 2 2 = 2 −43.82 and N = ( 
Let us define the function σ :
Let W be the fast Walsh transform defined by
f (x 1 , . . . , x m )(−1)
the number of relations in (6) satisfied by(u i 1 , · · · , u i m ) − the number of relations in (6) not satisfied by(u i1 , · · · , u im ). For the right value of (u i1 , · · · , u im ), above number follows the normal distribution N(2N , N (1 − 4 2 )). So, using N (1 − 4 2 ) ≈ N , for the right value of
2 dt .
Thus, when we use the threshold value Complexity of the Attack. The attack can be performed in two ways. One way is to precompute the coefficients (a j i1 , · · · , a j im ) and then perform all other computations in online phase. The other is to perform all the computations online. Complexity of both ways are described below and summarized in Table  2 .
Attack with Precomputation. To recover partial bits u i 1 , · · · , u i m of the initial initial state, in the precomputation phase, we get the coefficients of the left hand sides of the R approximation relations (5) between the LFSR initial states and the keystream words. Store the (320 + log 2 (R) )-bit values (U i , i) (i = 0, · · · , R − 1) in a list, where 
The complexity of the above attack to recover m bits of the initial LFSR state is as follows. The complexity of the above attack to recover m bits of the initial LFSR state is as follows. We assume the complexity of the basic operations as in Table 3 . The precomputation phase has time complexity of about 128R + R log 2 (R)(320 + log 2 (R) ) + (N + R)(320 + log 2 (R) ) and memory requirement of R(320 + log 2 (R) ) + N (m + 2 log 2 (R) ) bits if we apply a sorting algorithm of small memory requirement. The online phase takes 2 m log 2 (N ) -bits of memory and time complexity of 8N + m2 m log 2 (N ) . The data complexity of the online phase is 2 7 R bits. Let m = 138. Then λ ≈ 13.6(by e.g. Lemma 1 in the Appendix), N = 2 94.00 and R = 2 138.50 . For recovery of the whole n bits of the LFSR initial state, we recover (u 1 , · · · , u m ) and (u m , · · · , u 2m−1 ) using above-mentioned methods. Then restore the remaining 45 bits of the initial LFSR state and 64 initial FSM bits simultaneously using exhaustive search. The precomputation phase takes time complexity of 128R + 2(R log 2 (R)(320 + log 2 (R) ) + (N + R)(320 + log 2 (R) )) = 2 155.47 . (The number in the table is 2 147.47 regarding 1 time unit as the time needed to generate 256 bits of keystream which is not greater than the time cost of one trial in the exhaustive search .)The required memory is 2R(320 + log 2 (R) ) + N (m + 2 log 2 (R) ) = 2 148.34 bits. The online phase has time complexity of 2(8N +m2 m log 2 (N ) ) = 2 152.66 , memory requirement of 2 m log 2 (N ) = 2
144.55
bits, and data complexity of 2 7 R = 2 145.50 bits. The non-detection probability is less than
2 dt ≤ 0.01. We mention that the increased complexity due to sorting was not considered in [4] . 
Attack without Precomputation. To recover partial bits
time complexity is about 128R + R log 2 (R)(n + 1) + N (n + 1) + m2 m log 2 (N ) and memory requirement is about log 2 (N ) 2 m + (320 + 1)R bits. The data complexity is 2 7 R bits. Let m = 138. For recovery of the whole n bits of the LFSR initial state, we recover (u 1 , · · · , u m ) and (u m , · · · , u 2m−1 ) using abovementioned methods. Then restore the remaining 45 bits of the initial LFSR state and 64 initial FSM bits simultaneously using exhaustive search. The time complexity is 2(128R+R log 2 (R)(n+1)+N (n+1)+m2 m log 2 (N ) )+129·2 129 = 2 155.88 . The memory requirement is log 2 (N ) 2 m + (320 + 1)R = 2 147.10 bits, and the data complexity is 2 7 R = 2 145.50 bits.
Improving the Attack. We can reduce the data complexity without increasing the time complexity. For the Serpent S-box S 2 , we have 8 linear approximations with correlation 1 2 which is of the form
Using these approximations, we can get 8 linear approximation relations involving the LFSR initial state and keystream words with correlation κ. Thus we can reduce the data complexity at least by the factor of 2 3 . We can also reduce the memory requirement of the attack using the "Improved Hybrid Method" [4] without increasing time complexity or data complexity much.
Simulations and Results
Simulations for a Reduced Cipher
We validate our claims by simulating a reduced version of Sosemanuk keystream generator defined as follows. It consists of an LFSR of five bytes and an FSM of two bytes. The LFSR state at time t is (s t , s t+1 , . . . , s t+5 ). The LFSR is updated using the relation
where β is a zero of
The FSM state at time t is denoted by (R1 t , R2 t ). The FSM is updated as follows.
where, M = 0x59. The FSM has output
The keystream bytes are obtained as follows. Then we get a linear approximation relation
when t ≡ 1(mod 4), for each 8-bit mask Γ . In the simulation, we generate 2 . We get R approximation relations regarding the n-bit initial LFSR state and the keystream words. Then we get about N approximations regarding the latter m bits of the initial LFSR state. Applying the fast Walsh transform to an array with 2 m entries, we can recover the m bits correctly most of the time. We performed the experiments to recover the latter 24 bits of the initial LFSR state for 100 initial initial internal states as follows.
With the threshold 3 2 N 2 −13.24 = 206382, we were able to get the right 24-bit value in each case except when i = 26. In each case 0-4 false alarms occurred with average 1.18. A few minutes was spent on a Pentium IV 3.4GHz CPU with 1GB RAM for each case. This experimental results corroborate our assertions.
Simulations with Long Keystreams for Full Sosemanuk
To check if the correlation of relations (3) is correct in another way, we generate long keystreams for Sosemanuk for some initial internal states. We consider the following 2 LFSR initial states and 8 FSM initial states. • A: (0x9000, 0x8000, · · · , 0x1000, 0x0000)
• B: (0x9111, 0x8000, · · · , 0x1000, 0x0111) (the same as A except for the first and the last word) -FSM initial states: (0x0000, 0x0000), · · · , (0x7000, 0x7000) , which is the normalized deviation in the assumed normal distribution. In total, the observed correlation using the 2 50 relations is −2 −21.45 , which is very close to C(Γ ). This result also corroborates our assertions.
6 Correlation Attack on SNOW 2.0 SNOW 2.0 [11] consists of an LFSR consisting of 16 words and an FSM of 2 words. In [14] , it was shown that there exists a linear approximation relation of the LFSR bits and keystream bits with bias 2 and R = 2 193.77 . The time complexity of the attack for recovering m bits is 32R + R log 2 (R)(n + 1) + N (n + 1) + m2 m log 2 (N ) . (The factor 32 comes from the fact that 32 bits of keystreams are needed per one approximation relation.) Memory requirement is about log 2 (N ) 2 m + (512 + 1)R bits. The data complexity is 2 5 R bits. For recovery of the whole initial LFSR state, recover partial 192 bits of LFSR three times and then recover the initial FSM state by exhaustive search. The total time complexity is 3(32R+R log 2 (R)(n+1)+N (n+ 1) + m2 m log 2 (N ) ) = 2 212.38 . The memory complexity is about log 2 (N ) 2 m + (512 + 1)R = 2 202.83 bits. The data complexity is 2 5 R = 2 198.77 bits. Since the initialization of SNOW 2.0 is a reversible process, we can recover the key from the initial state.
Conclusion
We described an attack recovering the initial internal state with time complexity 2 147.88 , memory complexity 2 147.10 bits, and data complexity 2 145.50 bits. Though the attack does not threaten the claimed 128-bit security of Sosemanuk, it indicates that using keys longer than 150 bits for Sosemanuk does not guarantee the security level of the key size. The main reason Sosemanuk is vulnerable to the attack described in this paper is that the LFSR state is too small in the presence of a relatively large correlation between the LFSR state and the keystream words. Similar attack of complexity 2 204.38 is valid against SNOW 2.0.
